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Abstract
We analyze the stabilizing role of imperfect competition on ﬂuc-
tuations due to indeterminacy and endogenous cycles. In this paper,
imperfect competition is a source of monopoly proﬁts, because of pro-
ducer market power. Considering an overlapping generations model
with capital accumulation and elastic labor supply, we show that un-
der imperfect competition, the emergence of endogenous ﬂuctuations
requires a weaker substitution between production factors than under
perfect competition. In this sense, imperfect competition stabilizes
ﬂuctuations. However, we ﬁnd an opposite conclusion concerning the
elasticity of labor supply. Indeed, endogenous ﬂuctuations are com-
patible with a less elastic labor supply under imperfect competition.
JEL classiﬁcation: D43, E32.
Keywords: Indeterminacy, endogenous ﬂuctuations, imperfect competition,
monopoly proﬁts, mark-up.
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1 Introduction
Imperfect competition has notably been introduced in macroeconomic dy-
namic models to study the inﬂuence of internal increasing returns to scale
(Benhabib and Farmer (1994), Cazzavillan, Lloyd-Braga and Pintus (1998),
Lloyd-Braga (1995)) and mark-up variability (d'Aspremont, Dos Santos Fer-
reira and Gérard-Varet (1995), Gali (1994), Weder (2000), Woodford (1991))
on the emergence of endogenous ﬂuctuations. These works conclude that
imperfect competition promotes the occurrence of local indeterminacy and
endogenous cycles.2 A similar conclusion has recently been obtained by Ja-
cobsen (2000) even if, in his framework, imperfect competition aﬀects dy-
namics through a diﬀerent mechanism than the two previous ones. Indeed,
he has studied the role of the level of mark-up and monopoly proﬁts on the
occurrence of endogenous cycles.3 Introducing monopolistic competition in a
monetary overlapping generations economy where ﬁrms have a constant re-
turns to scale technology, he shows that contrary to a perfectly competitive
economy (Grandmont (1985)), endogenous ﬂuctuations are compatible with
an increasing labor supply if the mark-up is strong enough. It comes from an
additional wealth eﬀect due to the existence of monopoly proﬁts. However,
Jacobsen (2000) does not consider capital accumulation and so proﬁts are
constant at equilibrium.
In this paper, we study the inﬂuence of monopoly proﬁts on the emergence
of endogenous ﬂuctuations introducing monopolistic competition (Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977)) in an overlapping generations economy with elastic labor
supply and productive capital. In contrast to Jacobsen (2000), monopoly
proﬁts are not constant at equilibrium.4 In this framework, we discuss the
stabilizing dynamic properties of imperfect competition. We are able to
establish our results not only in function of the labor supply elasticity, but
also in function of the substitution between capital and labor.
Studying local dynamics, we show that the emergence of endogenous ﬂuc-
tuations requires a weaker substitution between capital and labor than in a
perfectly competitive economy (Reichlin (1986)). Indeed, the range for in-
determinacy and endogenous cycles of the substitution between capital and
labor decreases and becomes closer to zero when mark-up and monopoly
2For a survey, see Benhabib and Farmer (1999) or Silvestre (1995).
3In a related model, Dos Santos Ferreira and Lloyd-Braga (2002) show that market
power and monopoly proﬁts can be a source of endogenous growth in overlapping genera-
tions economies.
4Jacobsen (2000) also introduces imperfect competition on the labor market in order
to generate unemployment. For simpliﬁcation, we rather assume that the labor market is
perfectly competitive.
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proﬁts increase. In other words, concerning the substitution between cap-
ital and labor, endogenous ﬂuctuations can occur under a more restrictive
condition than under perfect competition. Moreover, this condition is not
veriﬁed by empirical studies.5 In this sense, imperfect competition stabilizes
ﬂuctuations. On the contrary, a higher level of mark-up increases the range
of elasticities of labor supply compatible with indeterminacy. Under imper-
fect competition, endogenous ﬂuctuations can occur if the labor supply is less
elastic than under perfect competition, which is in accordance with the usual
idea that labor supply is not too elastic with respect to the real wage. Hence,
from this point of view, imperfect competition rather promotes endogenous
ﬂuctuations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present
the model. In section 3, we study local dynamics. We conclude in section 4.
Some details are given in the Appendix
2 The Model
We consider an overlapping generations economy with discrete time, t =
1, 2, ...,∞. At each period, a continuum of consumers, living two periods,
is born and has a size normalized to one. When young, consumers supply
labor lt, save through the purchase of productive capital kt and consume
only when old. Capital totally depreciates after one period of use. Moreover,
consumer preferences are separable between consumption and leisure and can
be written:
BU(Ct+1/B)− V (lt) (1)
where B > 0 is a scaling parameter, Ct+1 represents the consumption and is
deﬁned by the aggregate of varieties:
Ct+1 =
(∫ 1
0
ct+1(i)
1/µdi
)µ
(2)
where µ > 1.6 The capital is deﬁned by the same aggregate of varieties. On
the utility function, we further assume:
5See among others Duﬀy and Papageorgiou (2000).
6Using this speciﬁcation, one can notice that µ/(µ− 1) > 0 represents the elasticity of
substitution between the diﬀerent varieties of good. This elasticity decreases with respect
to µ and tends to +∞ when µ tends to 1. In this last case, the diﬀerent varieties become
perfect substitutes.
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Assumption 1 The functions U(x) and V (l) are continuous for all x ≥ 0
and 0 ≤ l ≤ l, where the labor endowment l > 1 may be ﬁnite or inﬁnite.
They have continuous derivatives of every required order for x > 0, 0 < l < l,
with U ′(x) > 0, U ′′(x) ≤ 0, V ′(l) > 0 and V ′′(l) ≥ 0. Moreover, u(x) ≡
−xU ′′(x)/U ′(x) < 1 and liml→lV ′(l) = +∞.
Consumers do not only earn their labor income but also receive proﬁts
distributed by ﬁrms when young. Hence, noting ωt the real wage, ρt+1 the
real interest factor and pit the real proﬁts at period t, the budget constraints
of the consumer are deﬁned by:
kt = ωtlt + pit (3)
Ct+1 = ρt+1kt (4)
Taken into account that consumption is deﬁned by (2), each consumer
maximizes his utility function (1) under the two budget constraints (3) and
(4).7 He can solve this problem in two steps. First, he chooses his consump-
tion of each variety of ﬁnal good taken as given all other variables, like labor,
capital and aggregate consumption8:
ct+1(i) =
(
pt+1(i)
Pt+1
)− µ
µ−1 Rt+1
Pt+1
(5)
where Rt+1 = Pt+1Ct+1 =
∫ 1
0
pt+1(i)ct+1(i)di, pt+1(i) is the price of variety i
and Pt+1 =
(∫ 1
0
p
1
1−µ
t+1 (i)di
)1−µ
the aggregate price. Secondly, he determines
7Note at this stage that the overlapping generations model that we develop can also
be interpreted as a discrete time model with a representative inﬁnitely lived agent who
maximizes the utility:
+∞∑
t=1
βt−1[BU(Ct/B)− βV (lt)]
where β ∈ (0, 1) represents the discount factor and Ct the same aggregate of varieties as
above, and who faces the two constraints:
Ct + kt = ρtkt−1 + ωtlt + pit
Ct ≤ ρtkt−1
If the last inequality, which can be interpreted as a ﬁnance constraint, is binding at
equilibrium, one obtains exactly the same dynamics than in the overlapping generations
model that we present in this paper. For more details, see Seegmuller (2005).
8Some details are given in the Appendix
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his intertemporal choice between future consumption and labor:
U ′(ρt+1kt/B)ρt+1ωt = V ′(lt) (6)
This equation deﬁnes the labor supply. Indeed, substituting (3) into (6),
one obtains:
U ′(ρt+1(ωtlt + pit)/B)ρt+1ωt = V ′(lt) (7)
This expression implicitly determines the labor supply as a function of
real wage, real proﬁts and future real interest rate. Under Assumption 1, the
labor supply increases with respect to the real wage. Indeed, diﬀerentiating
equation (7), the elasticity lst ≡ ∂lt∂ωt ωtlt is given by:
lst =
1− u(Ct+1/B) ωtltωtlt+pit
v(lt) + u(Ct+1/B)
ωtlt
ωtlt+pit
> 0 (8)
where v(lt) ≡ V ′′(lt)lt/V ′(lt) ≥ 0.
In the production sector, each good i is produced by a single ﬁrm using
capital and labor as inputs and the constant returns to scale technology
yt = Af(at)lt, where f is the intensive production function, at = kt−1/lt the
capital-labor ratio and A > 0 a scaling parameter. We further assume:
Assumption 2 The intensive production function f(a) is continuous for
a ≥ 0, positively valued and diﬀerentiable as many times as needed for a > 0,
with f ′(a) > 0 and f ′′(a) < 0.
Assuming that there is monopolistic competition on the product mar-
ket, each producer maximizes its proﬁts facing the demand function dt(i) =
(pt(i)/Pt)
− µ
µ−1 (It/Pt), where It is the aggregate income. It means that the
elasticity of the demand of a variety of ﬁnal good is equal to µ/(µ − 1) in
absolute value and then, the mark-up is µ. At the symmetric equilibrium,
we deduce the following expressions for the real wage and the real interest
rate:
ωt =
1
µ
A [f(at)− atf ′(at)] ≡ ω(at) (9)
ρt =
1
µ
Af ′(at) ≡ ρ(at) (10)
Using these two equations, we can easily determine the level of real proﬁts:
pit = Af(at)lt − ρtkt−1 − ωtlt = µ− 1
µ
Af(at)lt (11)
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We can notice that since returns to scale are constant, proﬁts are due
to the existence of producer market power and are positively related to the
mark-up µ. When µ ∈ (1,+∞) increases (decreases), proﬁts increase (de-
crease). Furthermore, we obtain the perfectly competitive conﬁguration as a
limit case when µ tends to 1. Then, the real wage and the real interest rate
are respectively equal to the marginal productivities of labor and capital and
the monopoly proﬁts pit collapse to 0.
We can now deﬁne an intertemporal equilibrium. Substituting equations
(9), (10) and (11) into (3) and (6), we obtain:
kt = A
[
f(at)− 1
µ
atf
′(at)
]
kt−1
at
(12)
U ′
[
1
B
1
µ
Af ′(at+1)kt
]
1
µ2
A2f ′(at+1)[f(at)− atf ′(at)] = V ′
(
kt−1
at
)
(13)
These two relations determine the dynamics of the economy and deﬁne a
two-dimensional dynamic system with one predetermined variable, the capi-
tal.
Deﬁnition 1 An intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight is a se-
quence (kt−1, at) ∈ R2++, t = 1, 2, ...,∞, such that (12) and (13) are satisﬁed.
A steady state of the dynamic system (12)-(13) is a solution (kt−1, at) =
(k, a) for all t, such that:
A
[
f(a)
a
− f
′(a)
µ
]
= 1 (14)
U ′
[
1
B
f ′(a)ak
µf(a)− af ′(a)
]
=
V ′(k/a)[µf(a)− af ′(a)]2
f ′(a)[f(a)− af ′(a)]a2 (15)
Following Cazzavillan, Lloyd-Braga and Pintus (1998), we establish the
existence of a steady state by choosing appropriately the two scaling param-
eters A > 0 and B > 0 so as to ensure that one steady state coincides with
(k, a) = (1, 1). From equation (14), we obtain a unique solution:
A∗ =
µ
µf(1)− f ′(1) (16)
Taken as given A∗, there is a unique B∗ deﬁned by:
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U ′
[
1
B∗
f ′(1)
µf(1)− f ′(1)
]
=
V ′(1)[µf(1)− f ′(1)]2
f ′(1)[f(1)− f ′(1)] (17)
if the following condition is satisﬁed:
limx→+∞U ′(x) <
V ′(1)[µf(1)− f ′(1)]2
f ′(1)[f(1)− f ′(1)] < limx→0U
′(x) (18)
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, A∗ and B∗ are both strictly positive.
Proposition 1 When condition (18) and Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed,
(k, a) = (1, 1) is a steady state of the dynamic system (12)-(13) if and only
if A and B are the unique solutions of (16) and (17).
Before studying the emergence of endogenous ﬂuctuations in the neighbor-
hood of the steady state (k, a) = (1, 1), we deﬁne s(a) ≡ f ′(a)a/f(a) ∈ (0, 1)
as the elasticity of the intensive production function. Therefore, using equa-
tions (9), (10), (11) and y = Af(a)l, we can deﬁne the labor share, the
capital share and the proﬁt share in income as follows:
ωl
y
=
1− s(a)
µ
,
ρk
y
=
s(a)
µ
and
pi
y
=
µ− 1
µ
(19)
We can notice that in the limit case of perfect competition (µ tends to
1), the proﬁt share in income tends to 0, whereas s(a) (1− s(a)) represents
the capital (labor) share in income.
Finally, we note σ(a) = d ln a/d ln(ω(a)/ρ(a)) the elasticity of capital-
labor substitution. Then, using (9) and (10), we have:
1
σ(a)
=
d ln(f(a)− af ′(a))
d ln a
− d ln f
′(a)
d ln a
= − af(a)f
′′(a)
f ′(a)(f(a)− af ′(a)) (20)
Since s(a) = f ′(a)a/f(a), we obtain:
ω′(a)a
ω(a)
= − a
2f ′′(a)
f(a)− af ′(a) =
s(a)
σ(a)
ρ′(a)a
ρ(a)
=
af ′′(a)
f ′(a)
= −1− s(a)
σ(a)
(21)
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3 Indeterminacy and Cycles
Studying local dynamics, we analyze the emergence of endogenous ﬂuctua-
tions and the inﬂuence of imperfect competition on the dynamic properties of
the steady state. In order to do that, we ﬁrst diﬀerentiate the dynamic sys-
tem (12)-(13) in the neighborhood of the steady state (k, a) = (1, 1). In what
follows, we note s ≡ s(1) and σ ≡ σ(1). Moreover, εv ≡ V ′′(l)l/V ′(l) and
εu ≡ −U ′′(C/B)(C/B)/U ′(C/B) are evaluated at the steady state (k, a) =
(1, 1). Using expressions (21), one obtains:
dkt
k
=
dkt−1
k
+
(1− s)(s− σµ)
(µ− s)σ
dat
a
(22)
dat+1
a
= − (εu + εv)σ
(1− εu)(1− s)
dkt−1
k
+
[
s+ εvσ
(1− εu)(1− s) −
εu(s− σµ)
(1− εu)(µ− s)
]
dat
a
(23)
The trace T and the determinant D of the associated Jacobian matrix,
which represent respectively the sum and the product of the two eigenvalues,
i.e. the roots of the characteristic polynomial Q(λ) ≡ λ2 − Tλ+D = 0, can
be written:
T = 1 +
(s+ vσ)(µ− s)− u(1− s)(s− σµ)
(1− s)(1− u)(µ− s) (24)
D =
s
1− s
µ− s+ v[1− s+ (µ− 1)σ]
(1− u)(µ− s) (25)
In what follows, we analyze the characteristic polynomial Q(λ), i.e. the
trace T and the determinant D, to study the local stability of the steady
state. We just recall that, as it is well-known, the two eigenvalues have a
modulus smaller than one when Q(1) > 0, Q(−1) > 0 and D < 1. In
this case, the steady state is locally indeterminate and sunspot equilibria
appear around the steady state. Moreover, when the two eigenvalues are
complex conjugates and have a modulus which crosses the value 1 (Q(1) > 0,
Q(−1) > 0, D = 1), a Hopf bifurcation occurs, i.e. an invariant closed curve
appears around the steady state. In this case, sunspot equilibria occur around
the cyclical trajectory if it is locally stable.9 We now apply these results to
obtain the following proposition:
9For more details, see Grandmont, Pintus and de Vilder (1998) and Guesnerie and
Woodford (1992).
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Proposition 2 Assume that s < 1/2 and u < (1−2s)/(1−s), and consider
that there exists a steady state (k, a) = (1, 1) (Proposition 1). If 0 < σ < s/µ,
the steady state is locally indeterminate for εv < εvH and a Hopf bifurcation
occurs for εv = εvH , with:
εvH =
(µ− s)[1− 2s− u(1− s)]
s[1− s+ (µ− 1)σ] (26)
In all other cases, endogenous ﬂuctuations cannot occur.
Proof. Using equations (24) and (25), we ﬁrst notice that T > 1 and D > 0,
which ensures that Q(−1) > 0. Moreover, we have:
Q(1) =
(u + v)(s− σµ)
(1− u)(µ− s) (27)
Hence, Q(1) > 0 requires σ < s/µ. Finally, one notices that D increases
with respect to εv and D can be smaller than 1 because we assume s < 1/2
and u < (1 − 2s)/(1 − s). In fact under these two assumptions, D ∈ (0, 1)
for εv < εvH , D = 1 for εv = εvH and D > 1 for εv > εvH , where εvH is given
in the proposition. 
This proposition establishes that the emergence of ﬂuctuations due to
the volatility of agent expectations and deterministic cycles requires a weak
substitution between capital and labor and a not too concave utility function.
We now analyze more precisely the inﬂuence of imperfect competition on the
occurrence of such ﬂuctuations. In this model, the importance of imperfect
competition can be measured by the level of the parameter µ which represents
the mark-up.10
First, remark that s/µ decreases from s to 0 when µ increases from 1
to +∞. Therefore, when market power increases, indeterminacy and en-
dogenous cycles can emerge for a smaller range of elasticities of capital-labor
substitution since the upper bound of this range becomes closer to 0.11 More-
over, the emergence of endogenous ﬂuctuations requires a weaker substitution
between capital and labor than in a perfectly competitive economy. Indeed,
in this last case, indeterminacy and cycles can occur if σ < s.12 Hence, con-
10When µ increases, producers have a more important market power. This implies
greater levels of mark-up and monopoly proﬁts. Moreover, recall that in the particular
case where µ tends to 1, market power and monopoly proﬁts disappear. It corresponds to
the perfect competition conﬁguration.
11This result is quite restrictive since elasticities of capital-labor substitution too close
to 0 have not any empirical support. See for example Duﬀy and Papageorgiou (2000).
12One can refer to Reichlin (1986).
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cerning capital-labor substitution, imperfect competition does not promote
the appearance of endogenous ﬂuctuations, but rather stabilizes the economy.
The level of mark-up also aﬀects the range of labor supply elasticities
compatible with indeterminacy. Using (8) and (19), the elasticity of labor
supply evaluated at the steady state, that we note ls(v), can be written as
follows:
ls(v) =
1− u 1−sµ−s
v + u
1−s
µ−s
(28)
Since indeterminacy occurs for v < vH , the labor supply elasticity has to
be greater than ls(vH ). One can prove that if u is suﬃciently weak, which
means that utility for consumption is not too concave, and the elasticity
of capital-labor substitution is smaller than one, this lower bound decreases
with respect to the level of mark-up. Considering for simpliﬁcation the limit
case where u = 0, we have:
ls(vH ) =
1
vH
=
s[1− s+ (µ− 1)σ]
(µ− s)(1− 2s) (29)
which decreases with respect to µ when σ < 1. Hence, under imperfect
competition, indeterminacy requires a less elastic labor supply than in a
perfectly competitive economy, i.e. a condition on labor supply less stringent
and opened to criticism. From this point of view, imperfect competition
rather promotes endogenous ﬂuctuations.
We now give an intuitive interpretation of the emergence of local in-
determinacy in this model. Consider ﬁrst the case where there is perfect
competition (µ tends to 1) and assume that consumers expect a higher fu-
ture interest rate. Then, labor supply goes down (see equation (7)). At
equilibrium, labor increases and real wage decreases because labor demand
is negatively slopped. It has a negative eﬀect on labor income if the elasticity
of labor income ωl with respect to labor is negative (1 − s/σ < 0). In this
case, future capital stock decreases (see equation (3)). Hence, future interest
rate increases and expectations are self-fulﬁlling.
Consider now that there is imperfect competition (µ > 1). Following a
higher expected interest rate, the increase of labor has the same eﬀect as
before on labor income, because the mark-up is constant. However, there
is an additional eﬀect due to proﬁt distribution. Indeed, the increase of
labor raises monopoly proﬁts. Hence, the future capital stock decreases and
the future interest rate increases only if the negative eﬀect of labor income
dominates, which requires a smaller elasticity of capital-labor substitution
than in the previous case. Consequently, expectations are self-fulﬁlling for a
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weaker substitution between capital and labor than in a perfectly competitive
economy. Furthermore, an increase of the mark-up reinforces the positive
eﬀect of proﬁts on next period capital stock. It is why an increase of the level
of mark-up reduces the range for indeterminacy of elasticities of capital-labor
substitution. Finally, notice that dpit
pi
= (1− s)dlt
l
= (1−s)(1−u)
v
dρt+1
ρ
. It means
that the greater is v, the less important is the eﬀect of a variation of the
expected interest rate on monopoly proﬁts. This last remark explains why,
under imperfect competition, indeterminacy can occur for a less elastic labor
supply than in a perfectly competitive economy.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we analyze the stabilizing dynamic properties of imperfect
competition. In this way, we introduce monopolistic competition in an over-
lapping generations model with elastic labor supply and productive capital
in order to study the inﬂuence of the level of mark-up and monopoly proﬁts
on the occurrence of indeterminacy and endogenous ﬂuctuations. We ﬁrst
prove that imperfect competition stabilizes ﬂuctuations because it reduces
the range of elasticity of capital-labor substitution compatible with indeter-
minacy and cycles. However, the conclusion concerning labor supply elas-
ticity goes in the opposite direction. Indeed, under imperfect competition,
endogenous ﬂuctuations can also occur under less elastic labor supply.
Showing that imperfect competition reduces the range of technological
parameters compatible with the occurrence of endogenous ﬂuctuations, one
can then notice that some of our results are not in accordance with Jacobsen
(2000) who considers the case of a monetary overlapping generations model.
Indeed, he cannot obtain such a conclusion since he does not consider capital
accumulation and the unique production factor is labor in his framework.
Finally, this paper suggests that a ﬁscal policy rule characterized by a
balanced budget, a same constant tax rate τ ∈ (0, 1) on capital and labor
incomes and a lump-sum transfer It aﬀects local dynamics in an overlapping
generations economy. Indeed, such a model is similar to the one developed
in this paper except that real wage ωt and real interest rate ρt are now
respectively equal to the productivities of labor and capital and the two
budget constraints of consumers become:
kt = (1− τ)ωtlt + It
Ct+1 = (1− τ)ρt+1kt
(30)
Moreover, at period t, the budget of the government can be written:
12
τωtlt + τρtkt−1 = It (31)
If one puts τ = (µ− 1)/µ, one obtains exactly the same model and then
identical dynamic properties than in the imperfectly competitive framework
analyzed in this paper. Indeed, 1 − τ is then identical to the inverse of the
mark-up 1/µ and It = τyt to the monopoly proﬁts Af(at)lt(µ−1)/µ. Conse-
quently, this example shows that, in overlapping generations economies, the
introduction of balanced budget rules with constant tax rates and lump-sum
transfers modiﬁes local dynamics. This conclusion is clearly diﬀerent to the
one obtained by Guo and Harrison (2004) who show that such a ﬁscal policy
does not have any inﬂuence on indeterminacy in the optimal growth model.
Appendix
In what follows, we explain how we obtain expression (5). In order to
determine his consumption of each variety of ﬁnal good, each consumer max-
imizes his utility (1) subject to (2) and the two budget constraints that can
be rewritten:
Pt+1Ct+1 = rt+1(ωtlt + pit)
where Pt+1 is the aggregate price deﬁned in section 2 and rt+1 = Pt+1ρt+1
is the nominal interest rate. Since Pt+1Ct+1 represents the consumption ex-
penditures of a consumer, it is also equal to
∫ 1
0
pt+1(i)ct+1(i)di. Then, the
problem that the consumer faces can be written:
Maxct+1(i) BU
[(∫ 1
0
ct+1(i)
1/µdi
)µ
/B
]
− V (lt)∫ 1
0
pt+1(i)ct+1(i)di = rt+1(ωtlt + pit)
From the ﬁrst order conditions, we obtain:(
ct+1(i)
ct+1(j)
)1/µ−1
=
pt+1(i)
pt+1(j)
After some manipulations, we easily deduce the following expression:
ct+1(i) =
pt+1(i)
−µ/(µ−1)∫ 1
0
pt+1(i)−1/(µ−1)di
∫ 1
0
pt+1(i)ct+1(i)di
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Using Pt+1 =
(∫ 1
0
p
1
1−µ
t+1 (i)di
)1−µ
and
∫ 1
0
pt+1(i)ct+1(i)di = Pt+1Ct+1, we
obtain equation (5).
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